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ABSTRACT 
This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model, applied to Pakistani data, in 
which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to 
firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our 
model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, 
raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax 
base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are 
too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade 
deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to 
some underground activity.  We note, in particular, that incorporating a VAT without any other 
tax reductions greatly reduces the tax compliance of the service sector.   
 
We have applied our model to Pakistan, and have calibrated our model to an 8 year period 
from 2004-2011. We note that it gives a reasonable approximation of Pakistani macro data.  We 
then use a sectoral breakdown of tax data generated by the model to estimate tax gaps on a sector 
by sector basis.  We note that certain sectors are currently paying taxes below their potential, 
while others may be above their tax potential.  These sectoral gap estimates may be used as 
indicators of where greater tax enforcement efforts should be directed. 
  
                                                          
1
 This research was funded by  World Bank project, “A Computational General Equilibrium Approach to 
Sectoral Analysis for Tax Potential: An Application to Pakistan,” Prepared for Federal Board of Revenue 
(FBR) Islamabad, Tax Administration Reforms Project (Cr. 4007-PAK; Gr.TF:054392).   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In many developing and transition countries, economic activity in the underground 
economy is estimated in excess of 40 percent of GDP (Schneider and Enste 2000; Friedman et. al 
2000).
2
 This diversion into unofficial activity undermines the tax base and can significantly 
affect public finances and the quality of public administration (Loayza 1996; Johnson et al. 1997; 
Dessy and Pallage 2003). The illegal nature of underground activity also constrains private 
investment and growth.  One important cost imposed by the inability to enforce legal contracts is 
the limited access to formal credit markets. 
We develop a simple intertemporal general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, 
multiple production activities and credit rationing to explain the prevalence of a large 
underground economy and corresponding gap between potential and actual taxes collected.  Our 
model is then applied to Pakistan. In particular, we explore the link between tax rates, access to 
credit, and the extent of tax evasion, and examine the consequences of the underground economy 
for public finances and aggregate economic performance. Entry and exit into the underground 
economy is derived as part of optimizing behavior that depends on taxes and interest rates. Firms 
operating underground are subject to credit rationing by banks which reduce loans in relation to 
the firm’s nonpayment of taxes  
Since the size of the underground economy in the paper depends upon both endogenous and 
exogenous variables, our framework has scope for policy changes. In particular, we address the 
issue of policy responses towards the emergence of tax-avoiding activity and emphasize the 
ambiguous effects of taxation by means of numerical simulations of a computational general 
                                                          
2As in Braun and Loayza (1993), the underground economy is defined as a set of economic units which 
do not comply with one or more government imposed taxes and regulations, but whose production is 
considered legal”. 
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equilibrium (CGE) model for Pakistan. Economic reform will depend upon policies that reduce 
the various forms of tax evasion. 
Section II provides a brief overview of our modeling of the underground economy. Section 
III presents our dynamic CGE model. Section IV discusses the parameterization of the model 
and presents an initial calibration exercise. Section V discusses extensions to further 
disaggregation of the tax gap analysis. 
II. MACROECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
 The cost of operating in the underground economy is modeled in terms of the inability to 
borrow from the official banking system.  Banks in the model are assumed not to have perfect 
information about the firm’s true ownership of assets and its associated true tax obligation. We 
assume that due to collateral requirements, credit is provided only in relation to the firm’s 
implied ownership of assets, which is determined from its actual tax payment. The idea here is 
that in the face of default, banks can only seize those assets that have been officially declared by 
the firm. Hence, the higher the extent of tax evasion, the lower the implied value of firm assets, 
and the lower the amount of credit provided by the banking system. Our approach has some 
similarity to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) who model credit limits on loans. These limits are 
determined by estimates of collateral which, in turn, are determined by estimates of durable asset 
holdings by borrowers. Here, tax payments are used to estimate the value of the durable asset of 
the borrower, as the asset cannot be directly observed.   
We assume that firms can operate partially in the formal and partially in the underground 
economy. That part of their operation that takes place in the legal economy pays taxes and can 
borrow from the banking system. That part that is underground does not pay taxes and cannot 
borrow. Admittedly this distinction is artificial, but captures some of the benefits and costs of 
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operating in the underground economy discussed in the literature. In reality, the underground 
firm may still be able to finance its investment needs by relying on trade credits or borrowing 
from secondary lenders who charge higher than market interest rates and are willing to incur 
high risks.
3
  
Our approach also assumes that firms can evade taxes without any real risk of detection or 
punishment. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) point out that where public pressure on corruption or the 
enforcement ability of the government is relatively weak - as is the case in many developing 
countries - this is in fact a fitting assumption.  
III. A DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
 We have developed the formal structure of a dynamic general equilibrium model that 
endogenously generates an underground economy. Much of the structure of our model is 
designed to permit numerical implementation for Pakistan. Our model has   discrete time 
periods. All agents optimize in each period over a 2 period time horizon. That is, in period   they 
optimize given prices for periods   and    and expectations for prices for the future after   
 . When period     arrives, agents re-optimize for period     and    , based on new 
information about period    .  
Our approach is related to Gordon and Li (2009).  Here the government is able to tax a firm 
only if that firm uses the banking system.  When the firm uses a bank, it is assumed that the 
bank has access to the firm’s balance sheet, which it records. The bank then makes this balance 
sheet information available to the government, which is then able to collect taxes, in particular 
sales taxes, based upon its knowledge of the firm’s balance sheet. 
                                                          
3 Huq and Sultan (1991) note that in Bangladesh, while borrowing rates from commercial banks were 
around 12 percent, firms dependent on noninstitutional sources to meet their financing needs paid 
rates between 48 to 100 percent.  
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We use a dynamic approach in which both firms and banks optimize and in which the 
benefits to a firm of accessing the banking system are endogenous. Our approach is related to 
Dabla-Norris and Feltenstein (2005).  Here a firm compares the return to capital with the 
marginal tax rate on capital income.  If the return is greater than the tax rate, then the firm pays 
the full capital tax. If it is less than the tax rate, then the firm reduces its tax payments 
proportionally.  Hence the firm enters the underground economy gradually, as the gap between 
tax rates and returns to capital increases. At the same time banks use a firm’s capital tax 
payments, combined with the capital tax rate to obtain an estimate of the firm’s minimum 
capital value. This is thus the bank’s estimate of the firm’s collateral, and hence reflects a 
minimum estimate of the value of assets that the bank can seize if the loan fails.  This approach 
is motivated by the collateral constraints in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).  The collateral is 
represented by the bank’s estimate of the borrowing firm’s minimum capital which is, in turn, 
estimated by examining the firm’s tax return.  We should note that we are thus focusing on only 
a single type of tax evasion, namely, evasion of the capital income tax. As we shall see, indirect 
tax rates can change rates of evasion of the corporate income tax by changing the rate of return 
to capital. We do not, however, consider direct evasion of sales or value added taxes, for 
example.  
Our approach has the key feature that tax evasion is based upon optimizing behavior by 
firms, rather than upon some exogenous firm characteristics.  In particular, enterprises, as well as 
individuals, will balance their need to invest by borrowing from the banking system with their 
desire to reduce their tax obligations.  This optimizing behavior is, of course, forward looking. 
The detailed technical discussion for production, banking, consumption, government and foreign 
sector is provided in Appendix 1. 
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IV. SIMULATIONS 
 In this section we carry out numerical simulations, based upon the model whose technical 
structure is given in Appendix 1.  The model is designed to give some qualitative notion of the 
implications for the economy of tax evasion and entry into the underground economy.  Our goal 
is to calibrate the model to the dynamic path of the Pakistan macro economy, based upon the 
most recent available sources for the economy’s technological and policy parameters. 
We use an input-output (IO) matrix given in Ahmad, Barrett and Coady (1985)
4
, in which an 
87 sector matrix is derived to represent Pakistan’s technology for 1981.  This has been updated 
for 1989/90, and we use the coefficients in this updated matrix.  This matrix is aggregated by 
adding rows and columns to the 27 sector matrix used for this study. Sectoral value addeds are 
taken from the national income accounts for 2004 expanded to correspond to the 27 sector IO 
matrix. We use 2004 as a starting point as our 8 year dynamic simulation is from 2004 – 2011. 
The production coefficients in sectoral value added functions are Cobb-Douglas and are taken 
from the IO matrix. 
The model incorporates personal and corporate income taxes, sales taxes, and import tariffs. 
Our source for all tax rates is http://www.taxrates.cc/html/pakistan-tax-rates.html.  For the 
personal income tax we use the various slabs from 0 to 20 percent.  For the corporate tax rate we 
use 35% of net taxable income of a company. For nonresidents, a 15% rate is levied on the gross 
amount of royalties or technical service fees, and 30% for other payments under the presumptive 
tax regime. The standard rate of the sales tax in Pakistan is 16 percent. Note that these are 
                                                          
4
 “Input-Output Matrices for Pakistan 1980-81.” Discussion Paper, Development Economics Research 
Centre, University of Warwick. 
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statutory rather than effective rates. The model generates endogenous effective tax rates, which 
are different from rates generated by single equation estimates.  
Table 1. Base Case 
       Period 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Nominal GDP 1/ 100.0 137.8 133.4 181.2 314.1 475.3 538.3 785.6 
Real GDP 1/ 100.0 117.4 113.5 119.7 131.3 142.3 144.3 149.6 
Real GDP growth rate 3/ 17.4 -3.3 5.4 9.7 8.4 1.4 3.6 
Inflation 3/ 
 
17.4 0.1 28.9 58.0 39.7 11.6 40.8 
Price Level 1/ 100.0 117.4 117.5 151.4 239.2 334.1 373.0 525.3 
Nominal interest   
rate 3/ 6.9 10.5 3.6 3.6 8.4 13.1 7.7 9.7 
Budget surplus 2/ -1.4 -1.3 -1.6 -1.8 1.3 -1.2 -0.9 -2.2 
Trade Balance 2/ -3.7 -2.6 -2.0 0.0 -4.3 -2.0 -2.6 -1.1 
Import Duties 2/ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 
         Real return to 
 
Share of Sector in Legal Economy 
  
   
2005 2007 2009 2011 
  K1 1/ 4/ 100.0 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  K2 100.0 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  K3 100.0 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  K4 100.0 
 
3.7 5.9 27.0 58.5 
  K5 100.0 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   
1/ Normalized to period 1 of the base case. 
2/ As a percent of GDP. 
3/ In percent. 
4/  The capital types are specific to broad sectors of the input-output matrix.  The 5 capital types are: 
K1 = Mining 
K2 = Manufacturing 
K3 = Electricity, gas, construction 
K4 = Services, retail trade 
K5 = Public administration, health, education 
 
Exchange Rates time series are taken from the Statistics and DWH Department, the State 
Bank of Pakistan.  We use the annual average US dollar foreign exchange rates for the years 
2003-2010, as we wish to generate a dynamic macroeconomic path for these years. We assume 
that the structure of financing of the government budget deficit is an exogenous policy 
instrument, and we take the 2003-2010 shares from the data source TABLE 4.2, SUMMARY OF 
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PUBLIC FINANCE (CONSOLIDATED FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL ).  We make a similar 
exogeneity assumption for public and private capital inflows, which are taken from the TABLE 
8.1 of the same source.  Our source for the historical series of expenditure by the consolidated 
public sector is  http://www.sbp.org.pk/departments/stats/PakEconomy_HandBook/Chap-3.7.pdf 
where we use the shares of GDP table. 
Table 4. Pakistan: 10% VAT, 0% GST 
Period 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Nominal GDP 1/ 139.2 194.5 224.8 323.3 501.5 776.0 935.5 1415.2 
Real GDP  
1/ 
 
101.6 118.9 115.8 120.3 129.9 138.7 140.6 144.1 
Real GDP growth rate 3/ 17.0 -2.6 3.9 8.0 6.8 1.4 2.5 
Inflation 3/ 
  
19.5 18.6 38.5 43.7 44.9 18.9 47.6 
Price Level  1/ 137.0 163.6 194.1 268.7 386.1 559.5 665.4 981.8 
Nominal interest 
rate3/  14.1 21.6 11.2 13.5 20.5 29.4 19.0 25.0 
Budget surplus 2/ -6.5 -8.2 -8.9 -10.1 -8.0 -11.3 -10.4 -12.5 
Trade Balance 2/ -5.7 -5.4 -6.7 -6.4 -8.0 -6.8 -7.7 -7.4 
Import Duties 2/ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
          Real return to 
 
Share of Sector in Legal Economy 
   
   
2005 2007 2009 2011 
   K1 4/ 100.5 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K2 89.9 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K3 100.4 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K4 102.1 
 
4.2 11.1 34.6 80.8 
   K5 105.2 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    
1/ Normalized to period 1 of the base case. 
2/ As a percent of GDP. 
3/ In percent. 
4/  The capital types are specific to broad sectors of the input-output matrix.  The 5 capital types are: 
K1 = Mining 
K2 = Manufacturing 
K3 = Electricity, gas, construction 
K4 = Services, retail trade 
K5 = Public administration, health, education 
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Our model incorporates behavioral demand for money that depends upon interest and 
inflation rates, as well as real income. We use the estimates given in Qayyum (2005).  In order to 
use our model for counterfactual simulations, we first generate an equilibrium using benchmark 
policy, technological, and behavioral parameters described.
5
 The program used to solve for the 
equilibrium converges to an accurate approximation of a Kakutani fixed point in usually less 
than 20 seconds for the 8 discrete time periods we are currently simulating.  We run the 
macroeconomic model forward for eight years,
6
 giving tax rates and public expenditures their 
estimated values. We also suppose that the central bank maintains a fixed exchange rate, with the 
rate being fixed at the historical level of each year. Table 1 shows the results of the benchmark 
simulation. It may be worth making a few remarks concerning the simulated values. First, notice 
that our model generates moderate rates of growth in real GDP, with an average growth rate of 
5.9 percent over the total 8 year period.  This approximates Pakistan’s actual real growth rate 
over the period in question.  The budget is in deficit for all but 1 year, with an average deficit of 
1.1 percent of GDP.  This is lower than the actual historical deficit for the period.  The simulated 
interest rate is relatively stable, and averages 7.9 percent, which is in line with Pakistan’s interest 
rate.  The trade deficit is relatively stable and averages 2.3 percent of GDP, which is somewhat 
better than the current level in Pakistan.  The annual rate of inflation averages 22.3 percent, 
which is somewhat higher than the Pakistani average.    Finally, sector 4, services and retail 
trade, operates significantly in the underground economy for all 8 years of the simulation, 
indicating considerable tax evasion in retail trade.  This also possibly corresponds to the Pakistan 
                                                          
5
 The underlying computational general equilibrium program is written in FORTRAN 95 and is available 
by writing to Andrew Feltenstein (afeltenstein@gsu.edu). 
6 In practice, we take 2004 as the base year. By this we mean that initial allocations of factors and 
financial assets are given by stocks at the end of 2003. We have data for fiscal and other policy 
parameters for the next 8 years, that is, through 2011.  
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experience.  By the end of the 8 years of the simulation, the sector is under-reporting income for 
tax purposes by 31.5 percent. 
Suppose we now consider a change in the Pakistan tax code.  Namely we will impose a 
10 percent value added tax, leaving all other tax rate as in Table 1. Note that here, and in the 
following Tables, all numbers are relative to the benchmark case of Table 1.  Hence, for 
example, GDP and price levels change from 100 in period 1.  Pakistan has considered 
introducing a VAT, so this will be an example of the potential outcomes of such a reform.  The 
results are given in Table 2. We note that the tax increase leads to a small decline in real GDP 
over the 8 years of the simulation. The budget deficit becomes a surplus and there is also a trade 
surplus.  At the same time, there is a considerable increase in tax evasion by sector 4 which now 
is evading almost 75 percent of its tax liabilities.  Thus simply imposing a VAT without making 
other changes in tax policies would not seem to be a useful course of action. 
 
Accordingly, let us now suppose that we maintain the 10 percent VAT, but reduce the GST 
from 16 to 10 percent.  The aim of this exercise would be to reduce tax evasion.  The results are 
given in Table 3.  We see that real income has remained unchanged, as compared to Table 2.  
There has been a small improvement in tax compliance, which still remains much worse than in 
the base case.  This outcome leads us to conclude that the VAT introduction needs to be 
compensated for by a more dramatic tax reduction elsewhere. 
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Table 2. Pakistan: 10% VAT 
Period 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Nominal GDP 1/ 99.1 136.7 121.0 164.5 262.9 398.8 427.5 611.5 
Real 
GDP1/ 
 
98.2 116.5 112.1 118.6 129.8 142.4 144.3 149.1 
Real GDP growth rate 3/ 18.7 -3.8 5.8 9.4 9.7 1.3 3.3 
Inflation 3/ 
  
16.3 -8.0 28.5 46.0 38.3 5.8 38.4 
Price Level 1/ 100.9 117.3 108.0 138.7 202.5 280.0 296.3 410.2 
Nominal interest rate 
3/ 6.8 10.2 2.9 3.1 5.7 10.2 4.5 5.0 
Budget surplus 2/ 3.8 4.0 3.7 4.0 7.4 4.9 6.0 4.7 
Trade Balance 2/ -3.6 -2.5 -0.4 1.9 -2.0 0.8 1.3 3.8 
Import Duties 2/ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 
          Real return to 
 
Share of Sector in Legal Economy 
   
   
2005 2007 2009 2011 
   K1 4/ 100.6 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K2 108.5 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K3 100.8 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K4 101.1 
 
2.1 3.0 12.2 25.2 
   K5 101.4 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   
1/ Normalized to period 1 of the base case. 
2/ As a percent of GDP. 
3/ In percent. 
4/  The capital types are specific to broad sectors of the input-output matrix.  The 5 capital types are: 
K1 = Mining 
K2 = Manufacturing 
K3 = Electricity, gas, construction 
K4 = Services, retail trade 
K5 = Public administration, health, education 
 
As a fourth example, suppose we now reduce the GST to 0 percent, so that the only domestic 
indirect tax collected is the VAT.  The results of this exercise are given in Table 4.  We see that 
Sector 4 has greatly increased its tax compliance, even as compared to the base case of Table 1.  
At the same time, however, the revenues lost from the other sectors of the economy, which were 
not previously in the underground economy and hence did not increase their tax compliance, has 
outweighed the gains from Sector 4.  The budget deficit thus grows dramatically, leading to a 
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sharp increase in the domestic interest rate.  Real GDP falls, primarily because the rate of return 
to capital of Sector 2, manufacturing falls, leading to a decline in that sector’s output.   
Table 3. Pakistan: 10% VAT, 10% GST 
Period 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Nominal GDP 1/ 105.0 145.0 140.7 193.7 316.2 479.2 539.6 791.2 
Real GDP1/ 
 
98.9 117.0 113.2 119.0 130.0 140.9 143.8 149.1 
Real GDP growth rate 3/ 18.3 -3.2 5.1 9.2 8.4 2.0 3.7 
Inflation 3/ 
  
16.7 0.3 30.9 49.5 39.7 10.4 41.4 
Price Level 1/ 106.2 124.0 124.3 162.7 243.3 340.0 375.3 530.6 
Nominal interest 
rate3/  7.5 12.1 4.2 4.5 8.7 14.3 8.2 10.9 
Budget surplus 2/ -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 2.4 -0.3 0.7 -0.7 
Trade Balance 2/ -3.6 -2.6 -1.9 -0.1 -3.8 -1.3 -1.7 -0.2 
Import Duties 2/   1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 
          Real return to 
 
Share of Sector in Legal Economy 
   
   
2005 2007 2009 2011 
   K1 4/ 100.8 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K2 103.4 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K3 101.0 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K4 101.7 
 
2.5 4.2 17.1 36.7 
   K5 102.9 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    
1/ Normalized to period 1 of the base case. 
2/ As a percent of GDP. 
3/ In percent. 
4/  The capital types are specific to broad sectors of the input-output matrix.  The 5 capital types are: 
K1 = Mining 
K2 = Manufacturing 
K3 = Electricity, gas, construction 
K4 = Services, retail trade 
K5 = Public administration, health, education 
 
Let us now consider yet another proposed policy change, namely, an increased capital tax 
upon the banking industry.  Accordingly, we will increase the tax rate from its current 35 percent 
to 40 percent.  All other policy parameters stay the same as in Table 1. The results of this 
exercise are given in Table 5.  The outcomes are interesting, as we notice that there has been 
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very little improvement in the overall budget deficit.  At the same time, we see that there has 
been a considerable decrease in tax compliance by the Service Sector (Sector 4), of which the 
banking industry is a major component.  Thus the increased tax rate has caused an increase in 
evasion that has negated the impact of the higher tax rates on the banking sector. 
Table 5. Pakistan: 40% CAPITAL TAX ON BANKS 
Period 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Nominal GDP 1/ 100.0 137.9 132.6 178.8 312.9 472.7 538.7 782.0 
Real GDP1/ 
 
100.0 117.2 113.4 118.9 131.1 141.9 143.9 148.7 
Real GDP growth 
rate3/  
 
17.2 -3.2 4.8 10.2 8.3 1.4 3.4 
Inflation 3/ 
  
17.6 -0.6 28.7 58.7 39.5 12.4 40.5 
Price Level 1/ 100.0 117.6 116.8 150.4 238.6 333.0 374.4 525.8 
Nominal interest rate 
3/ 6.8 9.8 3.1 3.1 7.2 12.1 6.6 8.2 
Budget surplus 2/ -1.5 -1.0 -1.7 -1.6 1.4 -0.8 -1.2 -2.0 
Trade Balance 2/ -3.5 -2.3 -1.5 0.7 -4.0 -1.5 -2.1 -0.4 
Import Duties 2/ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 
          Real return to 
 
Share of Sector in Legal Economy 
   
   
2005 2007 2009 2011 
   K1 4/ 98.0 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K2 100.7 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K3 99.9 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K4 99.5 
 
2.7 4.3 20.3 44.6 
   K5 99.8 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   
 
   
1/ Normalized to period 1 of the base case. 
2/ As a percent of GDP. 
3/ In percent. 
4/  The capital types are specific to broad sectors of the input-output matrix.  The 5 capital types are: 
K1 = Mining 
K2 = Manufacturing 
K3 = Electricity, gas, construction 
K4 = Services, retail trade 
K5 = Public administration, health, education 
 
As a final exercise, let us carry out a reduction in the customs tariff, reducing the rate from 
25 percent to 20 percent.  This is a policy that is currently under consideration.  The results of 
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this simulation are given in Table 6.  As might be expected, we see a decline in import duties, as 
compared to Table 1.  Tax evasion remains essentially unchanged, and there is a slight decline in 
real GDP, as compared to Table 1, due to the expected increase in imports.  We thus see that this 
tariff changed has little effect on the overall real economy. 
Table 6. Pakistan: REDUCED CUSTOMS TARIFF 
Period 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Nominal GDP 1/ 98.9 136.2 131.4 177.0 312.2 471.7 539.9 786.2 
Real GDP 1/ 
 
99.9 117.0 113.1 118.4 131.1 142.0 144.7 149.2 
Real GDP growth rate3/ 17.2 -3.4 4.7 10.7 8.3 1.9 3.1 
Inflation 3/ 
  
17.5 -0.2 28.6 59.3 39.5 12.3 41.3 
Price Level 1/ 99.0 116.4 116.2 149.5 238.2 332.2 373.1 527.1 
Nominal interest rate 
3/ 6.4 9.7 3.0 3.0 7.2 12.0 7.2 8.9 
Budget surplus 2/ -2.0 -1.5 -2.2 -2.1 1.0 -1.3 -1.6 -2.4 
Trade Balance 2/ -3.4 -2.1 -1.3 1.1 -4.0 -1.4 -2.1 -0.4 
Import Duties 2/ 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 
          Real return to 
 
Share of Sector in Legal Economy 
   
   
2005 2007 2009 2011 
   K1 4/ 98.0 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K2 100.8 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K3 100.0 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   K4 99.9 
 
3.3 5.5 25.0 58.3 
   K5 99.8 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   1/ Normalized to period 1 of the base case. 
2/ As a percent of GDP. 
3/ In percent. 
4/  The capital types are specific to broad sectors of the input-output matrix.  The 5 capital types are: 
K1 = Mining 
K2 = Manufacturing 
K3 = Electricity, gas, construction 
K4 = Services, retail trade 
K5 = Public administration, health, education 
 
Our model helps us to identify those sectors that are underperforming from a tax point of 
view.  We therefore use the model to carry out a sectoral estimate of the tax gap.  Here the 
predicted outcomes of the general equilibrium model for 2010, assuming full compliance, are 
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compared with actual tax revenues collected.  That is, we set the “honesty” parameter for each 
sector at 0.  This is the parameter α in equation (3) in Appendix 1.  The general equilibrium 
model then generates a path for tax collections for the 8 years of the simulation, and we choose 
the predicted collections for 2010.  These are then compared with actual tax collections for 2010 
for selected sectors, as well as for the aggregate economy and the manufacturing sector.   The 
aggregate results are given in the Table 7 below.  They indicate that, on the level of the overall 
economy, there is a tax gap of about 58 percent, while in the manufacturing sector the gap is 
approximately 53 percent.  As might be expected from the general equilibrium model, capital 
intensive sectors such as iron and steel, and oil and gas, have smaller gaps than do less capital 
intensive sectors such as finance and insurance, or hotels and restaurants.  These calculations 
should help in the measurement of the overall problem, as well as to identify those sectors where 
improvement is most needed. 
It may be useful to add a few remarks about the absolute values of these gap estimates.  
Recall that the sectoral definitions of the general equilibrium model are based upon the 87 sector  
Pakistan input-output matrix.  These sectors are, in turn, based upon national income accounts 
value added definitions.  These sectoral definitions are not exactly the same as those in the actual 
tax collection tables which we use for the gap estimates.  Thus, for example, the national income 
account definition of Finance and Insurance may be broader than that used by the tax authorities.   
Accordingly, the general equilibrium model would generate greater expected tax revenue for 
Finance and Insurance, assuming perfect compliance, than would be reflected in actual tax 
collection data.  Hence the estimated compliance gap would be relatively large, as we see in the 
Table.  Of course the opposite could also be true, that the national income account definition 
could be narrower than the tax definition, leading to some under estimations of particular gaps.   
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Table 7: Tax Gaps by Selected Sectors in percent 1/ 
Sector 
   
Gap 
Mining & Quarrying 
  
-96.9 
Manufacturing 
  
-52.5 
(of which) 
   
 
1. Chemicals 
 
-67.5 
2. Automobiles -48.3 
 
3. Cigarette & Tobacco  103.4 
 
4. Iron and Steel 
 
-10.5 
 
5. Oil and gas 
 
-25.7 
 
6. Paper & Paper Board  -53.2 
 
7. Textile  
 
-59.2 
 
8. Edible Oil  
 
75.2 
 
9. Cement  
 
-49.0 
 
10. Sugar  
  
-91.2 
 
11. Pharmaceuticals  -46.9 
 
12. Fertilizer  
 
-23.0 
Telecom 
   
-81.3 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 
 
-73.4 
Finance and Insurance 
 
-93.3 
Hotels and Restaurants 
 
-85.3 
Other 
   
-53.8 
Total Economy 
  
-58.3 
 
1/ A number of  manufacturing sectors have been excluded from the disaggregation.   
They are included in the category "other". Other sectors that are not included in the terms of reference,  
but for which it is possible to calculate gaps, have been included. 
Accordingly, it is best to look at broad sectors, such as the overall economy, manufacturing, or 
retail sales, for example, for absolute values of gaps as there is a closer comparison between 
national income account and tax collection definitions for these categories. For more narrowly 
defined sectors, it is best to look at the gap estimates as reflecting relative (compared to other 
sectors) rather than absolute gaps. 
CONCLUSION 
We have constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates endogenous tax 
evasion as part of intertemporal optimizing behavior by firms.  We have used parameters from 
Pakistan to calibrate our model to an 8 year period from 2004-2011, and note that it gives a 
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reasonable approximation of Pakistani macro data.  We note that the service sector, at 
equilibrium, consistently evades some portion of its taxes. 
We then incorporate a value added tax of 10 percent in a series of counterfactual simulations, 
as the introduction of such a tax is currently under consideration by Pakistan.  We note that 
incorporating a VAT without any other tax reductions greatly reduces the tax compliance of the 
service sector.  If, on the other hand, the VAT introduction is accompanied by abolishing the 
GST, then tax compliance rises, but revenues from the non-service sectors decline, interest rates 
rise, and real GDP growth slows. 
We also use the model to carry out a sectoral estimate of the tax gap.  Here the predicted 
outcomes of the general equilibrium model for 2010, assuming full compliance, are compared 
with actual tax revenues collected.  That is, we set the “honesty” parameter for each sector at 0.  
The general equilibrium model then generates a path for tax collections for the 8 years of the 
simulation, and we choose the predicted collections for 2010.  These are then compared with 
actual tax collections for selected sectors, as well as for the aggregate economy and the 
manufacturing sector.  They indicate that, on the level of the overall economy, there is a tax gap 
of about 58 percent, while in the manufacturing sector the gap is approximately 53 percent.  As 
might be expected from the general equilibrium model, capital intensive sectors such as iron and 
steel, and oil and gas, have smaller gaps than do less capital intensive sectors such as finance and 
insurance, or hotels and restaurants.  These calculations should help in the measurement of the 
overall problem, as well as to identify those sectors where improvement is most needed.  Our 
approach demonstrates a method for gap analysis which can be further developed to incorporate 
additional information on sectoral structures and use sectoral estimates of honesty parameters.  
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APPENDIX 1 
A General Equilibrium Specification 
 In this section we develop the formal structure of a dynamic general equilibrium model 
that endogenously generates an underground economy. Much of the structure of our model is 
designed to permit numerical implementation for Pakistan. Our model has n discrete time 
periods. All agents optimize in each period over a 2 period time horizon. That is, in period t  they 
optimize given prices for periods t  and 1t  and expectations for prices for the future after 1t  . 
When period 2t   arrives, agents reoptimize for period 2t   and 3t  , based on new 
information about period 2t  .  
Production 
There are 8 factors of production and 3 types of financial assets: 
1-5 Capital types  9.  Domestic currency 
6. Urban labor 10.  Bank deposits 
7. Rural labor 11.  Foreign currency 
8. Land 
 
The five types of capital correspond to five aggregate nonagricultural productive sectors.
7
  
An input-output matrix, At, is used to determine intermediate and final production in period t. 
The matrix is 27 x 27, using the disaggregation of Ahmad, Barrett and Coady (1985).  
Corresponding to each sector in the input-output matrix, sector-specific value added is produced 
using capital and urban labor for the nonagricultural sectors, and land and rural labor in 
agriculture.  
The specific formulation of the firm's problem is as follows. Let j
Kiy ,
j
Liy be the inputs of 
capital and urban labor to the jth nonagricultural sector in period i. Let GiY be the outstanding 
                                                          
7 We could have any number of capital types without affecting the structure of the model. 
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stock of government infrastructure in period i. The production of value added in sector j in 
period i is then given by: 
 ( , , ) 
j j
ji ji Ki Li Giva va y y Y   (1) 
where we suppose that public infrastructure may act as a productivity increment to private 
production.  
Sector j pays income taxes on inputs of capital and labor, given by ,  Kij Lijt t  respectively, in 
period i. The interpretation of these taxes is that the capital tax is a tax on firm profits, while the 
labor tax is a personal income tax that is withheld at source. 
We suppose that each type of sectoral capital is produced via a sector-specific investment 
technology that uses inputs of capital and labor to produce new capital. Investment is carried out 
by the private sector and is entirely financed by domestic borrowing  
Let us define the following notation: 
HiC   = The cost of producing the quantity H of capital of a particular type in period i.  
ir      = The interest rate in period i. 
KiP  = The return to capital in period i. 
MiP   = The price of money in period i.  
i  = The rate of depreciation of capital. 
Suppose, then, that the rental price of capital in period 1 is 1P . If 1HC  is the cost-minimizing 
cost of producing the quantity of capital, 1H , then the cost of borrowing must equal the present 
value of the return on new capital. Hence: 
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2
1
1 1
2
1
(1 )
(1 )
in
Ki
H i
i
j
j
P H
C
r
 



 
 

 
 
 
 


    (2) 
where    is the interest rate in period j, given by: 
 1/j Bjr P  
where    is the price of a bond in period j. The tax on capital is implicitly included in the 
investment problem, as capital taxes are paid on capital as an input to production.  
The to invest depends not only on the variables in the above equation, but also upon the 
decision the firm makes as to whether it should pay taxes.
8
 This decision determines the firm’s 
entry into the underground economy. We assume that the firm’s decision is based upon a 
comparison of the tax rate on capital with the rate of return on new capital. Formally, suppose 
that we were in a two period world. Suppose that: 
 2
1
11
K
K
P
t
r


 
that is, the present value of the return on one unit of new capital is greater than the current tax 
rate on capital. In this case we assume the investor pays the full tax rate on capital inputs. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that: 
 2
1
11
K
K
P
t
r


 
Here the discounted rate of return is less than the tax rate. The extent to which the firm goes 
into the underground economy is determined by the gap between the tax rate and the rate of 
return to investment. That is, the firm pays a tax rate of 1Kt  where: 
                                                          
8 In reality, we can regard the tax rate on capital as the generalized tax rate, including taxation, 
regulation, and corruption (bribes). 
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1
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P
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r
t t
t
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  
  
   
  
  
  
 (3) 
Here 0    and higher values of   lead to lower values of taxes actually paid. That is, the 
ratio 1
1
K
K
t
t
 reflects the share of the sector that operates in the above ground economy.  Hence   
represents a firm-specific behavioral variable. An “honest” firm would set 0  , while a firm 
that is prone to evasion would have a high value for  .  
Banking 
     We will suppose that there is one bank for each nonagricultural sector of the economy. There 
are 5 such sectors, and hence 5 banks, corresponding to each of the aggregate capital stocks. 
Each bank lends primarily to the sector with which it is associated. The banks are, however, not 
fully specialized in the sector they correspond to. We make the simplifying assumption that each 
bank holds a fixed share of the outstanding debt of its particular sector. It then holds additional 
fixed shares of the debt of each of the remaining sectors.  We make this assumption of 
diversification of assets in order to allow for a situation in which a firm that evades taxes, and 
thereby enters the underground economy, might receive varying degrees of credit rationing from 
the different banks to which it applies for loans. 
Our premise is that banks have no direct way of knowing whether specific firms operate in 
the underground economy. We assume that banks only care about the amount of capital that they 
estimate the firm may have. If the firm defaults on its loan, then this represents the best estimate 
of the amount that the bank could seize. The bank would, presumably, be willing to lend an 
amount equal to at least the estimated firm capital.  
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We assume the borrower is required to show the bank his tax returns in order to obtain a 
loan. There is a single, flat corporate tax rate that the borrowing firm faces. Hence, suppose that 
1KT  represents taxes actually paid by the borrower in period 1. This is known to the bank, as the 
potential borrower is required to present his tax returns. Thus if the borrower fully complied with 
his tax obligation, and hence carried out no underground activity, the value of his capital, 1Kˆ  , 
would be given by: 
 1
1
1
ˆ K
K
T
K
t
  
In this case the bank lends an amount 1L , where 1 1HL C , as the bank would not be able to 
seize the full value of the loan in the case of a default. The situation we have described would, in 
the case of perfect certainty, have credit rationing when the estimated value of the firm’s capital 
is less than its loan request. If the firm’s capital is greater than its loan request, there would be no 
credit rationing. 
In a more realistic case of uncertainty about both the true value of the firm, as well as about 
the bank’s own ability to seize the firm, one might expect the lending process to be somewhat 
different. Accordingly, we will suppose that a simple functional form determines bank lending as 
a function of the amount requested as well as the estimated value of the firm’s capital. We define 
the amount the bank lends, 1L , as: 
 
1
11
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
1
H
H H
H
H
K
KC
L C C
K C K
C

 
   
    
    
 
  (4) 
Here  represents a measure of risk aversion by the bank. If 0  , there are no credit 
restrictions, and the bank ignores estimates of the borrower’s estimated net worth.  As   rises, 
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the bank increasingly restricts lending if the term in brackets is less than 1. Thus if a firm 
operates entirely in the underground economy it will not be able to borrow to finance investment. 
If banks are highly risk averse, they will never lend more than a firm’s estimated net worth, 
which is based on its tax return. This tax return therefore represents all the information the bank 
needs in order to determine its response to a request for a loan. 
Consumption 
There are two types of consumers, representing rural and urban labor. We suppose that the two 
consumer classes have differing Cobb-Douglas demands and endowments. The consumers 
maximize intertemporal utility functions, which have as arguments the levels of consumption 
and leisure in each of the two periods.  
Formally, the consumer’s problem is then given by equation 5.9  The definition of the 
notation follows. 
Max 1 1 1 2 2 2( ),   ( , , , , , )Lu Lr Lu LrU x x x x x x x x       (5) 
such that: 
(1 )i i i Lui Lui Lri Lri Mi Mi Bi Bi i Bfi Bfi it Px P x p x P x P x e P x C              (5a) 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1K A Lu u Lr r M B BF FP K P A P L P L P M r B P B e P B TR N          
2 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2(1 )K A Lu u Lr r M M B BF BFP K P A P L P L P x r x e P x TR N          
 i iC N  
1log log (log log )iBi Bi i BFi BFi i Fi
i
e
P x e P x r r
e
           (5b) 
1 2log( / ) log
Lui Lri
ui ri
Lui Lri
P P
L L a a
P P

 

       (5c) 
                                                          
9
 See Feltenstein and Shamloo (2012) for a discussion of this modeling approach. 
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2 2
2 2 0 1 2 2 2 2
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1
B B
r
P x d d t P x d


 
     
 
       (5e)    
where:  
Pi  = price vector of consumption goods in period i. 
xi  = vector of consumption in period i. 
Ci = value of aggregate consumption in period i (including purchases of financial assets). 
Ni = aggregate income in period i (including potential income from the sale of real and 
financial assets). 
ti = vector of value added tax rates in period i. 
PLui = price of urban labor in period i. 
Lui = allocation of total labor to urban labor in period i. 
xLui = demand for urban leisure in period i. 
PLri = price of rural labor in period i. 
Lri = allocation of total labor to rural labor in period i. 
xLri = demand for rural leisure in period i. 
a2 = elasticity of rural/urban migration. 
PKi = price of capital in period i. 
K0 = initial holding of capital. 
PAi = price of land in period i. 
A0 = initial holding of land. 
δ = rate of depreciation of capital. 
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PMi = price of money in period i. Money in period 1 is the numeraire and hence has a price of 
1.  
xMi = holdings of money in period i. 
PBi = discount price of a certificate of deposit in period i. 
πi = domestic rate of inflation in period i. 
,i Fir r = the domestic and foreign interest rates in period i. 
xBi = quantity of bank deposits, that is, CD's in period i. 
ei = the exchange rate in terms of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency in 
period i. 
xBFi = quantity of foreign currency held in period i. 
TRi = transfer payments from the government in period i. 
a, b, ,     = estimated constants. 
id  = constants estimated from model simulations. 
The Government 
The government collects personal income, corporate profit, and value-added taxes, as well as 
import duties. It pays for the production of public goods, as well as for subsidies. In addition, the 
government must cover both domestic and foreign interest obligations on public debt. The 
resulting deficit is financed by a combination of monetary expansion, as well as domestic and 
foreign borrowing  
The Foreign Sector 
The foreign sector is represented by a simple export equation in which aggregate demand for 
exports is determined by domestic and foreign price indices, as well as world income. The 
specific form of the export equation is: 
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where the left-hand side of the equation represents the change in the dollar value of exports in 
period i, πi is inflation in the domestic price index,  ie is the percentage change in the exchange 
rate, and Fi is the foreign rate of inflation. Also, wiy represents the percentage change in world 
income, denominated in dollars. Finally, σ1 and σ2 are corresponding elasticities.  
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